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In this article I analyse how the law participates in the (re)production process of the subject, the state and
religion, and how the law’s indefiniteness allows various constructions of them all. In the first part of the
article I discuss the Islamic headscarf cases of the European Court of Human Rights as examples of how
the discursive constructions of the state and the subject can be challenged by means of disobedience. Here
the focus is particularly on Turkey and on France, where the principle of secularism is largely regarded as
the  basis  of  the  republic  and of  the  national  identity.  The  law provides  an  arena  where  the  disobedient
subject and the state can challenge and re-establish the prevailing conceptualisations of the subject. In the
second part of the article I address the Court’s alleged Islamophobia. I explore how the constructions of
the state and the subject contribute to the way religion is framed in the Court’s argumentation in relation
to the freedom of religion guaranteed under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The
analysis shows that religion can be framed as a personal belief system, a cultural tradition, or politics
which, in turn, affects the course of legal argumentation. I conclude that the Court can plausibly be
accused of Christian bias, but that this conclusion is often based on insufficient analysis of the Court’s
case law. This article contributes to the interdisciplinary discussion on the headscarf bans from the socio-
legal perspective. The aim is to explore what, besides providing legal solutions, the law does.
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Introduction
The state operates through subjects, such as citizens, civil servants, criminals, and soldiers etc. who
are produced through various everyday practices. None of these subjectivities are neutral. For
example, the acceptance of an individual as a citizen or otherwise acknowledged member of society
may include some qualitative requirements: one is required to be a good citizen. According to
Foucault, the form of power that applies itself to everyday life categorises individuals, marks them
by their  own individuality,  attaches them to his own identity and imposes on them a law of truth
that must be recognized by themselves and others (Foucault, 2002, p.331). Our membership of a
nation is affirmed daily, through symbols and rhetoric that are so routine that we barely notice them
(Billig, 1995, pp. 24, 26). Law is one of the arenas where this process takes place.
According to Bourdieu, the law is a battleground where holders of legal capital compete to reach a
position where they can say what the law is (Bourdieu, 1986). The fact that law needs interpretation
introduces potential for insoluble conflict, and the legal field becomes an arena where each
participant attempts to force their conceptual framework on other participants (Paunio, 2010, pp. 9-
10).The law can be understood as being constantly (re)constructed in legal discussion and practice:
the law is what the law does. Law participates in (re)constructing the power relations in the society
all  the  while  it  (re)constructs  itself.  My  interest  is  to  explore  what,  besides  providing  answers  to
legal questions, the law, actually does.
In  the  first  part  of  this  article  I  discuss  the  constructive  aspect  of  law  and  ask  what  kind  of
subjectivity, state and religion the law produces through an analysis of the Islamic headscarf cases
in the European Court of Human Rights (the Court), focusing on cases concerning Turkey and
France.  In  both  of  these  countries  the  state  and  the  subject  are  constructed  in  relation  to  religion.
The state-subject relation is also topical in both countries; in Turkey the political power shifts have
shaken the core qualities of the Kemalist citizen-subject, and recently France introduced a ban on
veiling in public, which has now resulted in the case S.A.S v France (2014).  In the second part of
the article the relationship between the state and religion in the Court’s case-law is discussed more
generally and the Court’s alleged Islamophobia is critically assessed. My analysis shows that the
ways in which religion is discursively constructed either as a personal belief system, as politics or as
cultural tradition, affects the course of legal argumentation. This way the legal outcome of the case
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is actually pre-determined before even identifying and applying the relevant legal norms to the
facts.
In so far as the discursive constructions of subjectivity, the  state  and  religion  cannot  be  based  on
legal rules, the doctrinal approach to the case-law is an insufficient method of analysis. The
categories the law operates with are not natural ones, but constructed, indefinite and political (see
Butler 1999, 161; Lackey 2014, 745). Constructing meaning not only implies the indefiniteness of
words and projecting meaning onto concepts (what do we mean by the word ‘Islamic headscarf’?),
but also constructing the social reality (what does it mean to wear an Islamic headscarf?).
Methodologically speaking, the analysis is based on the tools provided by new rhetoric and
discourse analysis. I apply Kenneth Burke’s (1950) concepts of identification and division in
discussing the ways in which the subject, the state and religion are constructed in the Court’s
argumentation. In Burke’s theory, identification means the identifying of one phenomenon as
another or identifying one person with another person, group or with a certain feature. Division, on
the other hand, is the opposite of identification. The explicit or implicit processes of identification
and division are linked with persuading the audience to agree with the interpretation of the subject
matter provided in the text. Identification and division practices are important means of creating and
sustaining social order, as well as a means of constructing reality as we perceive it (see Sakaranaho,
1998, pp. 46-47). Before moving on to discussing the actual workings of the law, the analysis is
contextualised with a brief discussion on the secularity principle in Turkey and in France and the
state’s relationship with the citizen subject in each country.
The relationship between the state, the subject and religion in Turkey and France
Modern Turkey has been a republic since 1923, when it emerged as a nation-state after the collapse
of  the  Ottoman empire.  Regarding  religion,  Turkey  opted  for  the  disestablishment  of  the  Muslim
faith, following the model of the European liberal democracies. The French principle of secularity,
laïcité, formed the basis for Turkey’s adoption of secularism in the form of laiklik. Laiklik was the
key element of Kemalism, the state ideology established by the founder of the Republic, Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk. Religion became a matter of private conscience, while it was simultaneously
acknowledged that Islam was the official religion of the Turkish society (Benhabib, 2010, p. 453).
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The republic was thus distinguishable from its predecessor by a certain weeding out of the state’s
rootedness in religion. This change would not have been possible without creating a new subject-
position for the people: the republic needed citizens. In the Ottoman empire there were no citizens,
vatandaş), rather, there were believers, mümin. Similarly there were no people, millet, rather there
was the Muslim community, umma (Ayyildiz, 2007, p. 323). Thus the concept of citizenship has
been a defining element of modern Turkey.
The current debate over the headscarf can be traced back to the birth of the Turkish republic. The
new citizen had to look and act modern and commit to the new foundations of the state. The project
also required the construction of a secular and modern national identity, and the new woman (yeni
kadın) was raised as its symbol (Sakaranaho, 1998, pp. 20-21). Under the direction of Atatürk, the
republic launched a PR campaign to unveil women and thus create a new ‘Ideal Woman’, no longer
oppressed by Ottoman-Islamic rule but modern, emancipated, and fully visible in the public sphere
of citizens (Vojdik, 2010, p. 678). Since 1925, almost without interruption, there has been a ban on
the wearing of the headscarf in public institutions such as schools, courts and the Parliament.
During and after the mid-1980s the issue became more volatile as some female university students
in Istanbul began challenging the ban on headscarves, arguing that it violated their right to freedom
of religion. These young women organised protests, demonstrations and hunger strikes to persuade
the state officials to eliminate the ban. The protests resulted in the repeal of the headscarf ban in
1989 and again in 1991. The Turkish Constitutional Court, however, reversed both repeals,
highlighting the essential importance of the principle of secularity for the democratic order of
society (Cinar, 2005, pp. 679, 668-669; Vojdik, 2010, p.82).
The official narrative of Kemalism and the Kemalist identity was contested by Islamic and feminist
groups, and the state responded to the challenge (Sakaranaho, 1998, p. 54). The ban became more
specific, and penalties were introduced for its violation, ranging from warnings to expulsion from
school or loss of employment (O'Neil, 2010, pp. 71, 77). The Turkish state, despite being secular,
has been anything but indifferent or neutral about religion. The public sphere was introduced as a
secular space, but at the same time religious matters of the Muslim population were brought under
the new Department of Religious Affairs, Diyanet İșleri Bașkanliǧi.
In recent years there have been some significant power shifts in Turkish politics. The Islamic AKP,
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (‘Justice and Development Party’) has been the ruling party since 2002
and the official subjectivity seems to be undergoing change as religion is no longer strictly reserved
to  the  private  sphere.  The  secular  opposition  fear  that  moves  to  get  rid  of  the  partial  ban  on
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headscarves, for instance, could be the first steps towards establishing an Islamic republic. On the
other hand, the government’s supporters argue that the popularly elected government represents
modern democratic Turkey, tolerant of moderate Islam, and must protect itself from those seeking a
return to Turkey's past history of military coups (Q&A: Turkey's military and the alleged coup plots
2013).
In France, laïcité is said to be based on The Separation of Churches and State Act from 1905 and
itself enshrined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen from 1789. Since then, the
notion of laïcité has been constitutionally validated ever since the Constitution of the Fourth
Republic during the years 1946-58 stipulated that 'France is a laïque Republic' (Liogier, 2009, pp.
29-30). According to Liogier (2009, p. 26), the principle ‘was imbued from the start with a
particular administrative mindset, one of control and public valorisation/devalorisation of religious
phenomena and groups’. Liogier claims that France is in fact one of the European states that most
frequently interferes with religious matters (Liogier, 2009, p. 26). Moreover, the meaning of laïcité
is contested in France. Veroniqué Altglas (2010, p. 493) distinguishes between a tolerant laïcité and
a hard-line laïcité and notes that there is a great variety of principles that have been associated with
the secularity principle, such as the principle of separation between church and state, state neutrality
in religious matters, and the state’s duty to guarantee the freedom of religion and thought.
Furthermore, laïcité is  often considered not just  a legal issue,  but a crucial  part  of French cultural
identity (Altglas, 2010, p. 495).1
The contested nature of the secularity principle was manifested in the debate concerning the 2004
law against donning ostentatious religious symbols in French public schools, as both the supporters
and the critics of the law utilized laïcité in their argumentation (Akan, 2009, pp. 238, 244-245). At
the same time as introducing the headscarf ban in public schools, the first private Muslim high
school under state contract was established, and the French Muslim Council (CFCM) was founded
in 2003.2 The idea to gather different Muslim groups in France under one organisation was first
introduced in 2000 by the Minister of the Interior. Following a meeting with representatives of
various Muslim groups, a document was adopted entitled ‘Principles and legal basis governing the
relations between public powers and the Muslim faith’, in which the participant organisations
declared their allegiance to the French Constitution, to separation between state and religion, and to
the public order. According to Akan (2009, 250), the CFCM has accomplished little with respect to
the daily lives of the French Muslims, but has been quite active in backing up state politics (Akan,
2009, pp. 238, 241, 244-246, 248, 250). For example, in 2006 the CFCM first announced that it
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opposed the headscarf ban in schools, but afterwards acquiesced in its use and even discouraged
demonstrations against the law (Le Monde 2003 and 2004 as cited in Akan, 2009, p. 251). In 2011
France introduced another ban on religious symbols, this time explicitly targeting Muslim women.
It is now prohibited to cover one’s face in public spaces, which in practice means prohibition of the
full Islamic veil, the burqa and the niqab. The special Committee set up to study the use of Islamic
veiling in France concluded that the burqa was incompatible with the fundamental values of the
republic, with the principles of equality, liberty and fraternity (Hunter-Henin, 2012, pp. 615-616,
623).
In both Turkey and in France, the citizen-subject is one that shows primary allegiance to the state by
committing to the secularity principle.3 From the state’s perspective, rejecting the official
subjectivities, for example by wearing the headscarf, can be regarded as a challenge to the
established system, as disobedience. Drawing from the discussion on civil disobedience, this kind of
symbolic disobedience can be best understood in terms of communication between the citizens and
the state (see Brownlee, 2009). The state can use its communicative powers and participate actively
in moulding the official subjectivities by activating the legal process against dissenters. While
individuals can use the method of disobedience in order to address the members of their society,
likely  as  not  the  state  will  also  be  the  first  party  to  claim  that  a  certain  individual  or  group  has
abused the rights and freedoms protected by the law. This kind of tactic can be used to open a
negotiation on the acceptable use of rights, their meaning and the limits of the subjectivities.
The legal process of producing the subject is never a completed process, and the subject always
needs to be constructed anew (Althusser, 2008, p. 48; see also Hurri, 2011, pp. 118). The qualities
attached to the subject depend on whose position prevails. For a state actively challenging the use of
individual rights, this exercise of symbolic power is an activity of recruitment, where it persuades or
forces individuals to enlist as subjects of the system and internalise the requirements imposed on
them. In sum, we have an individual calling the law by the means of disobedience and the law
calling the individual by invoking the question of disobedience, each trying to mould the other
(Hurri, 2011, pp. 5, 58, 69, 118). In the following analysis I show how the discursive battle between
the state and the disobedient subjects, manifesting their dissent by wearing the headscarf in public,
takes place in the legal field as the parties to the cases try to persuade the Court to adopt their
constructions of the subject, the state and religion.
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Battle over the subject, the state and the scarf
When assessing cases involving a possible breach of freedom of religion (Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights) and freedom of assembly (Art. 10), the Court first evaluates whether
there has been an infringement of such a right in the first place. If the answer is affirmative, the
court assesses whether the infringement is prescribed by law and whether it had a legitimate aim.
The last and, for the purposes of this article, most interesting assessment is whether the interference
with the right was necessary in a democratic society, i.e. was there a pressing social need for such a
measure. Lastly, the Court evaluates whether or not the measure was proportionate to the aims
pursued.
Leyla Şahin was a student at Istanbul University’s faculty of medicine when the Vice-Chancellor of
the University issued a circular announcing that students with beards and students wearing the
Islamic headscarf would be refused admission to lectures, courses and tutorials. Şahin was refused
access to courses and written examinations and suspended for a semester for taking part in an
unauthorised protest against the measures adopted by the university. The Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights concluded that the prohibition on wearing headscarves in
universities constituted an interference with Şahin’s right to practice her religion. The Court also
found that the restrictions were prescribed by law and considered that the interference pursued the
legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and that of protecting public order.
As to whether the interference was necessary, the Court concluded that the principle of secularism
could be considered necessary for protecting the democratic system in Turkey (ss. 15-27).
Leyla Şahin also called into question the neutrality of the state by claiming that the headscarf
prohibition  was  not  in  fact  introduced  in  order  to  preserve  the  neutrality  and  secularity  of  the
teaching institutions and implied that there was some other reason behind the ban. It is possible to
read Şahin’s argument in the context of the political power struggles and history of military coups
in Turkish society. She argued that the aim of the headscarf prohibition was ultimately to preserve
the status quo in power relations, and not to protect the rights of others or the democratic order
(Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 2004, ss. 90-91, 100). This challenge to the legitimacy of the prohibition
went unrecognised by the Court, because it could not be translated into the language of the law.
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The Grand Chamber of the Court embraced, as it has in many previous cases before, the
identification of democracy and pluralism and the state’s role as ‘a neutral and impartial organizer
of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs’ in a democratic society (ss. 106, 107). In its
argumentation the Court constructed ‘opposing groups’ whose interests the state had to regard
neutrally and impartially (s. 107). Thus the state itself was dissociated from the disputes as its own
interests were not at stake. It is noteworthy that, prior to the legal assessment of the case, under the
heading ‘Relevant Law and Practice’ the Court discussed the ‘History and Background’ of the
headscarf ban, in which the Court constructed the socio-political context of the legal question at
hand. This contextualisation introduced the setting in which the Court was going to assess the
headscarf in more detail, that is, in the political context. In this section the Court identified the
headscarf as a political statement, an identification to which the Court returned in its conclusions (s.
114): ‘In Turkey, wearing the Islamic headscarf to school and university is a recent phenomenon….
Those in favour of the headscarf see wearing it as a duty and/or a form of expression linked to
religious identity. However, the supporters of secularism ...see the Islamic headscarf as a symbol of
a political Islam...’ (Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 2005, s. 35, emphasis added.) Şahin’s attempt to contest
the political contextualization of the headscarf by questioning the rationale of the prohibition and
the democratic nature of the Turkish state was in vain. The Court set up a political context for the
headscarf instead of interpreting it in a context of personal belief system. It is important to note that
identifying the headscarf with politics is not an obvious and inevitable move stemming from the
law.4
The second crucial line of argumentation concerned the subject construction. Leyla Şahin
emphasised that the decision to wear the headscarf was made of her own free will: that following
the religious duty was her desire and that ‘...the [university] students were discerning adults who
enjoyed full legal capacity and were capable of deciding for themselves’ (Leyla Şahin v. Turkey,
2005, s. 101, emphasis added; see also s. 71). The government, on the other hand, stressed that the
headscarf is a religious duty imposed on women and divided religious duty from religious freedom,
thus trying to segregate religious duties from the scope of freedom of religion:
Turning to the applicant’s argument that the Koran imposed a duty to wear the Islamic headscarf, the
Government argued, firstly, that religious duty and freedom were two different concepts that were not
easily reconciled. The former notion required, by definition, submission to divine, immutable laws,
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while the notion of freedom presupposed that the individual enjoyed the widest possible range of
opportunities and choices. (s. 92, emphasis added.)
The Grand Chamber recognised that Leyla Şahin wore the headscarf by choice but saw ‘no reason
to depart from the approach taken by the Chamber, that is from the view that ‘in the Turkish
context, it must be borne in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol, which is presented or
perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may have on those who choose not to wear it’ (s. 115).
The crucial point here is that the government had again successfully identified the headscarf with
politics: ‘the Court does not lose sight of the fact that there are extremist political movements in
Turkey  which  seek  to  impose  on  society  as  a  whole  their  religious  symbols  and  conception  of  a
society founded on religious precepts’ (s. 115). Leyla Şahin was thus perceived as a political actor
(although perhaps not an autonomous individual making free choices) and not just a private person
exercising her freedom of religion. This discursive move by the Court allowed the public order to
be placed on the legal scales; if the headscarf had been recognised solely as an expression of
personal belief, this would not have been possible.
In Doǧru v. France (2008), the Court established the social context of the case in such a way that
also endorsed the political aspects of the headscarf. In Doǧru the applicant was an eleven-year-old
Muslim girl who wore a headscarf to school. She refused to take it off for physical education and
sports classes and was expelled from the school for breaching duty to attend classes regularly. The
Administrative Courts upheld the decision to expel her and found that her attitude had created an
atmosphere of tension in the school and that she had overstepped the limits of the right to express
and manifest her religious beliefs on the school premises. After the Conseil d’Etat had declared the
parents’ appeal inadmissible, the case was brought to the European Court of Human Rights (ss. 5—
16.).
In order to emphasise the political aspect of the headscarf the Court first introduced a contradiction
between the principle of laïcité and the Muslim population: ‘[f]rom the 1980s the French secular
model was confronted with the integration of Muslims into society, particularly in schools’. (s. 19).
‘In France, the troubles have given rise to various forms of collective mobilisation regarding the
question  of  the  place  of  Islam  in  Republican  society’  (s.  21). The Court referred to the Stasi
commission5 and cited the commission report from 2003, which stated that
…instances of behaviour and conduct that run counter to the principle of secularism are on the increase,
particularly in public society. ... The reasons for the deterioration in the situation ... [are the] difficulties in
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integrating experienced by those who have arrived in France during the past decades, the living conditions in
many suburbs of our towns, unemployment, the feeling experienced by many people living in France that
they are the subject of discrimination, or are even being driven out of the national community; these people
explain that they thus lend an ear to those who incite them to fight what we call the values of the Republic.
.... In this context it is natural that many of our fellow citizens demand the restoration of Republican authority
and especially in schools (s. 21).
Again, the Court constructed the state as a neutral and impartial guardian of the democratic order
and of the harmony between ‘opposing groups’ (s. 62). Interestingly, wearing the headscarf was not
identified as the real issue in the case, but rather it was the applicant’s stubbornness, her refusal to
comply, her disobedience:
[The Court] accepts that the penalty imposed is merely the consequence of the applicant's refusal to
comply with the rules applicable on the school premises – of which she had been properly informed –
and not of her religious convictions, as she alleged. (s. 73, emphasis added)
...the applicant refused on seven occasions to remove her headscarf during physical education classes,
despite her teacher's requests and explanations for those requests. Subsequently, ...the authorities
concerned made many unsuccessful attempts over a long period of time to enter into dialogue with the
applicant and a period of reflection was granted her and subsequently extended. ...(s. 74, emphasis
added)
...With regard to the applicant's proposal to replace the headscarf by a hat, - -the question whether the
pupil expressed a willingness to compromise,  as  she  maintains,  or  whether  –  on  the  contrary  –  she
overstepped the limits of the right to express and manifest her religious beliefs on the school premises,
as the Government maintain and appears to conflict with the principle of secularism, falls squarely
within the margin of appreciation of the State. (s. 75, emphasis added.)
With the cases of Şahin and Doǧru we can reconstruct the ideal citizen subject who is loyal to the
secular state and to the established values of society.6 According to Althusser (2008, p. 1), the
concept of the subject is inherently dualistic. A person can be constructed either as the ‘subject of’
an action or being ‘subject to’ something. Typically, the Other is framed as ‘subject to’ rather than a
‘subject  of’,  and  this  is  exactly  what  seems  to  have  happened  in  the  Court’s  argumentation.  By
relying on the state’s interpretation of the meaning of the headscarf, the Court denied the applicants
their  subject  position  as  a  self-fulfilled  and  mature  citizen,  as  ‘subject  of’,  one  who is  capable  of
making up her own mind (see Vojdik, 2010, pp. 665, 670-671). Instead, they were positioned as
being oppressed by a religious practice incompatible with the principle of gender equality and in
need of protection by the state. At the same time, by identifying Islam with fundamentalist politics,
the Court construed Şahin and Doǧru themselves as being a threat to a democratic society. The
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Court’s conclusion supported the states’ view that a publicly expressed Muslim identity was
incompatible with the subject position of the citizen. Women wearing the headscarf were
represented as the Other which is needed to define the proper members of society. By producing
otherness, it is possible to produce opposites, mirror images of the proper citizen. This is why a
woman’s own perception of the wearing of a headscarf is irrelevant: she is not needed as a subject,
but as the Other. (See Sakaranaho, 1998, pp. 29-30).7
Despite the Court’s take on the headscarf cases, it does not always identify Islam with politics. In
the next section I discuss other types of cases concerning the relationship between the state, the
subject and religion, in which Islam is perceived differently and in which the legal outcome has
varied accordingly. As a result I argue that it is an oversimplification to suggest that the Court is
Islamophobic and that for a more complete picture the cases concerning Islam have to be looked at
more carefully.
 Islam v. Christianity?
The European Court of Human Rights has faced accusations of being unsympathetic to the claims
of those from non-Christian traditions, especially Islam (See Evans, 2006, pp. 71-73; Gülalp, 2010,
pp. 455-460; Mayer, 2012, pp. 223-225; Moe, 2012, pp. 245, 255, 265-267). It is admittedly
plausible to argue that the Court’s perception of Islam is oversimplified and far from neutral; for
example in the case of Refah Partisi v. Turkey (2003) the Court quite blatantly identified Islam as a
totalitarian movement in disguise and described Sharia law as essentially contrary to democracy.
(Ss. 101, 103). However, this is not the whole truth of the Court’s assessment of Islam. Despite their
different  legal  outcomes,  the  blasphemy  cases  in  the  Court  are  consistent  in  that  in  all  of  them
religion, be it Christianity or Islam, is identified as personal belief. In them, religion is not discussed
in any relation to politics and the need to protect the interests of the state does not emerge. The most
influential blasphemy cases so far have been the cases of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994),
Wingrove v. The United Kingdom (1994) and Murphy v. Ireland (2003) in which the Court has
established a balancing act between the applicant’s freedom of expression, on the one hand, and the
right of others to respect for their freedom of religion, on the other. With references to these cases




In the case of İ.A v. Turkey, the proprietor and managing director of a publishing house was
convicted of blasphemy for publication of a book by Abdullah Rıza Ergüven entitled Yasak
Tümceler (‘The Forbidden Phrases’). The Court concluded that the book overstepped the limits of
freedom of expression and included an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam. Thus, the Court
considered that the infringement of his right to freedom of expression was intended to provide
protection against offensive attacks on matters regarded as sacred by Muslims and that there was a
pressing social need for such an infringement (s. 29). The case of Aydin Tatlav was in many ways
similar to this, as Tatlav had published a book series entitled İslamiyet Gerçeği (‘The Truth about
Islam’) and was subsequently punished for blasphemy by Turkish authorities. This time the Court
ruled that there had been a violation of Tatlav’s freedom of speech, because his critique of Islam
was not directed at religious individuals and because the Court found that it did not amount to an
attack  on  the  holy  symbols  of  Islam.  Rather,  the  Court  submitted,  Tatlav’s  work  had  a  socio-
political tone. In both these cases Islam was constructed as a personal belief system without any
political connotations.
In the case of Ahmet Arslan et al. v. Turkey (2010),  the  Court  drew a  line  as  to  what  extent  it  is
possible  to  identify  religion  with  politics.  The  case  was  about  a  group  of  men  belonging  to  an
Islamic minority group (Aczimendi tarikatÿ) who were arrested for walking in the city of Ankara
wearing the head garment characteristic of their religious community. The Turkish government
argued that it was necessary to sanction them in order to preserve public order and to avoid acts of
religious provocation and proselytism. The Court ruled in favour of the applicants, stating that the
alleged existence of a danger to democratic principles had not been proved. In Ahmet Arslan et al.
the  Court  identified  the  religious  garment  as  an  expression  of personal belief. According to the
Court, the difference between this case and the other cases where the applicants had been
sanctioned for wearing religious outfits, such as the headscarf, was that the latter cases concerned
specific educational institutions (2010, s. 50).  According to MartÍnez-Torrón (2012, pp. 55-6), the
Ahmet Arslan case is a rare exception to the Court’s support for the Turkish authorities’ application
of  the  constitutional  principle  of laiklik in  the  form  of  restrictive  policies  towards  the  use  of
religious  clothing  in  public.  Alternatively,  the  case  can  again  be  seen  as  an  example  of  how
construing religion differently case by case leads to different legal outcomes.
Besides the personal and political, the Court has also regarded religion in terms of cultural tradition
in cases such as Lautsi and others v. Italy (2011) which concerned the presence of crucifixes in
school classrooms, and Folgerø v. Norway (2007) and Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey (2007),
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both of which concerned religious education in public schools. In Lautsi, the crucifix, unlike the
headscarf, was not perceived as a ‘powerful external symbol’ with a ‘proselytising effect’ (ss. 102-
3).  The Italian government tried to persuade the Court to identify Catholicism with the Italian
culture by stating that besides its religious meanings, the crucifix also had cultural and identity-
linked symbolic meanings. (ss. 36, 66, emphasis added.) The State pointed out that the presence of
the crucifix ‘was the expression of a “national particularity”, characterised notably by close
relations between the state, the people and Catholicism attributable to the historical, cultural and
territorial development of Italy and to a deeply rooted and long-standing attachment to the values of
Catholicism’ (2011, s. 36, emphasis added). The Court noted that the crucifix is most of all a
religious symbol, but accepted the government’s submission on the meaning of the symbol in its
specific cultural and traditional context. (See also Leckey 2013, 754.)
In Folgerø and Zengin the Court balanced between religion as tradition and religion as personal
belief. The context for this evaluation lies again in the relationship between the state and religion.
Norway has a state religion and a state church, and constitutional privileges are afforded to the
Evangelical-Lutheran faith. In the case of Folgerø, non-Christian parents lodged a complaint under
Article  9  and  Article  2  of  Protocol  No.  1  (the  right  to  education  and  the  State’s  responsibility  to
respect parents’ convictions in teaching) concerning the domestic authorities’ refusal to grant their
children exemption from the compulsory subject of Christianity, religion and philosophy (known as
KRL). The KRL was, again, intended to be objective, critical and pluralistic. The government
emphasised the importance of Christianity for the national identity:
The KRL subject was designed to promote understanding, tolerance and respect among pupils of
different backgrounds, and to develop respect and understanding of one’s identity, the national
history and values of Norway, and for other religions and philosophies in life. (s. 72, emphasis
added)
Without going into all the relevant aspects of the case here, the Court eventually held that there had
been  a  violation  of  Article  2  of  Protocol  No.  1.  Ultimately  the  Court  gave  priority  to  the  private
aspect of religion, but it nevertheless accepted the government’s view on the significance of
Christianity within the Norwegian cultural tradition:
[T]he fact that knowledge about Christianity represented a greater part of the Curriculum for
primary and lower secondary schools than knowledge about other religions and philosophies
cannot,  in  the  Court’s  opinion,  of  its  own  be  viewed  as  a  departure  from  the  principles  of
pluralism and objectivity amounting to indoctrination ... In view of the place occupied by
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Christianity in the national history and tradition of the respondent State, this must be regarded
as falling within the respondent State’s margin of appreciation in planning and setting the
curriculum. (s. 89, emphasis added)
The facts were similar in the Zengin case. The Zengin family adhered to Alevism, which is
generally considered to be a branch of Islam. Again, the applicant was seeking an exemption for his
daughter  from  religious  culture  and  ethics  classes,  which  he  claimed  were  not  conducted  in  an
objective, critical and pluralistic manner. The Turkish government employed the same argument as
the Norwegian government, claiming that the purpose of the classes was to promote understanding,
tolerance and respect among pupils from differing backgrounds and to develop understanding and
respect for individual identities, Turkey’s national history and values and other religions and
philosophies of life. The Court ultimately concluded that there had been a breach of the applicant’s
right under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 because the content of the curriculum was not perceived to
be neutral. However, before reaching the result, the Court held Sunni Islam to be a cultural tradition
and confirmed that greater priority to knowledge of Islam in itself ‘cannot be viewed as a departure
from the principles of pluralism and objectivity which would amount to indoctrination’ (s. 63).
The way that religion was contextualised in all of the above-mentioned cases affected the course of
legal  argumentation.  In  the  blasphemy cases  in  which  religion  was  treated  as  a  belief  system,  the
Court balanced two individual rights: freedom of expression and the right to protection from
offence to one’s religious beliefs. In the headscarf cases the Court construed religion as an aspect of
politics and weighed freedom of religion and freedom of association against the rights of others and,
most importantly, against the interest of the state, which ultimately concerned the preservation of
the democratic order. Religion was deemed, at least partly, to be a cultural tradition in cases
concerning the curriculum and the meaning of crucifixes in classrooms, and that identification
allowed the Court to widen the scope of the state’s margin of appreciation. In all these cases, the
Court’s contextual approach becomes understandable only in relation to the historical and
constitutional relationship between the institutionalised religion and the nation state; rather it
engages in the power struggles over the people. The contextual approach also reveals the way the
Court reproduces the status quo of the political power relations in the responding states. Turkey is a
good example of this: when manifesting one’s religion is perceived as a threat to the prevailing
order, the threat can be defused by identifying religion with politics, which, in turn, allows the issue




In  this  article  I  have  discussed  the  active  role  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  in
constructing the subject, the state and religion. In the cases the subject and the state have been
constructed with contesting and re-establishing the relationship between the state and religion. I
have argued that religion can be constructed either as a belief system, a tradition or politics and that
these identifications are not self-evident and cannot be based on the legal rules. This choice in turn
affects the course of the Court’s legal argumentation and the rights and interests weighed on the
scales of justice.
Both in Turkey and in France the relationship between religion and the state is based on the
principle of secularism. The citizen-subject is expected to show primary allegiance to the state and
refrain from publicly manifesting their religious affiliations. In Italy, and in Norway, where religion
has a constitutional connection with the state, loyalty to religion is not in contradiction with loyalty
to the state. As a belief system or a tradition, religion is deemed harmless for society, and the need
to balance individual rights with the interests of society at large does not emerge; however, in the
political context, religious freedom is weighed against the state’s interest for self-preservation.
Based on my analysis, it can be argued that the Court’s Christian bias is at least partly a
misconception. It is more plausible to argue that the Court’s decision-making is related to the way
religion (Islam, Christianity or other) is discursively constructed and the ways in which this
construction leads the legal argumentation.
In the headscarf cases, the applicants have expressed their dissenting interpretation of the good
citizen-subject. In fact it can be argued that the real issue in the cases were exactly that; from the
state’s point of view the applicants had shown disrespect for the official subjectivity and therefore,
for the state. Disobedience can be used as a strategy to contest the qualities attached to the loyal
citizen on one hand; on the other hand disobedience can also be utilised by the state to re-establish
the subject-position of a good citizen. By invoking the conditions of full membership of society, the
state calls on its subjects to re-establish their loyalty to the state.
Similar dynamics can be identified in the most recent headscarf case S.A.S. v France (2014). The
applicant contested the fairly recent French law prohibiting for anyone to conceal their faces in
public, thus banning the Islamic niqab –  a  full  veil  covering  the  face  apart  from  the  eyes.  The
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applicant contested the legitimacy of the aims pursued by the law, as well as the necessity of such a
law in a democratic society (ss. 76-78).
The discursive battle over the meaning of the Islamic veil in S.A.S v. France was again between the
veil as an expression of personal religious belief, and the veil as a political, fundamentalist
statement. The Court accepted that the law aimed at addressing the questions of public safety and
protection  of  the  rights  and  freedoms of  others.  Furthermore,  the  Court  found that  ‘under  certain
conditions the “respect for the minimum requirements of life in society” … or of “living together”
… can be linked to the legitimate aim of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”’ (s.
121).  According to the Court ‘the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is
perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of others to live in a space of socialisation
which makes living together easier’ (s. 122). At the same time, the Court recognized the similarities
of the present case with the previously mentioned case of Ahmet Arslan and Others. In the Court’s
opinion, however, the crucial difference between the two cases was that ‘the full-face Islamic veil
has the particularity of entirely concealing the face, with the possible exception of the eyes’ (s.
136).8
Finally, the Court found the ban proportionate on the grounds that, despite being wide in scope and
in practice targeting Muslim women, the ban ‘is not expressly based on the religious connotation of
the  clothing  in  question  but  solely  on  the  fact  that  it  conceals  the  face’  (s.  151).  Removing  the
question of individual freedom from the legal scales, the Court stated that ‘the question whether or
not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public places constitutes a choice of society’
(s. 153). Finally, the Court granted the French Government a wide margin of appreciation in the
matter and found no violation of the Convention (ss. 155-163).
The  case  of S.A.S. v. France may be taken as illustrative of the main argument presented in this
article: the Islamic headscarf cases in the European Court of Human Rights are fundamentally
rooted in the discursive battle over the meaning of the headscarf/veil. In S.A.S. he Court has once
again chosen to emphasise the political meaning of the veil in the contemporary French context
disregarding the applicant’s attempt to establish a veiled woman as a freely choosing, emancipated,
participating and cooperative western subject.9
It is interesting to note that while the Court identifies the headscarf with politics, the question of
political rights such as freedom of expression has not risen in the case law concerning the scarf.10
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Another noteworthy feature of the cases, especially in S.A.S. is that the applicant places great
emphasis on her commitment to the value base of the nation-state, to the features of the good
citizen. Here we can draw a parallel to the ways in which the state embraces the deviant subject,
such as gay men and lesbians, by including them in the conventional life script of a proper citizen
subject, and at the same time defuses their radical potential (see e.g. Haritaworn 2010; Leckey
2013. 746).
In  this  article  I  have  explored  what  the  law,  besides  providing  legal  solutions,  actually  does,  and
more specifically, how the law constructs the state, the subject and religion. With my analysis I
hope to have illustrated how the indeterminacy of law can be used to generate social reality and
how the law extends its effects beyond the legal realm. In the cases discussed here, the state and the
citizen subject have contested each other in order to challenge or re-establish the meaning of the
Islamic headscarf and its legal implications. In the legal argumentation the meaning of religion has
altered depending on how the headscarf has been contextualised. As argued throughout this article,
the identification of religious symbols either as a personal belief, as a cultural tradition or a political
statement cannot be based on the legal rules, which makes the course of the legal argumentation
somewhat unpredictable – and at the same time perfectly consistent.
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Notes
1 On the meaning of secularism, see also Leckey 2013, p.746.
2 The roughly 3 million foreign-born Muslims in France are largely from France’s former colonies of Algeria,
Morocco and Tunisia (Hackett 2015; see also Aissaoui 2008).
3 According to Richard Thompson Ford, the republican tradition in France requires a deeper commitment to the
common set of values in exchange for solidarity, social welfare and belonging than that of the liberty-oriented
traditions of the United States and Canada (Ford 2013, p.713).
4 In fact, there is no obvious meaning for wearing the headscarf or other types of veils in general. Muslim women
themselves are ambivalent about its’ meaning, as some deem it more of a cultural than religious practice (see
Beaman 2013, p.731; Leckey 2013, p.750).  The meaning of the headscarf can also be altered from outside its
culture. Anna C. Korteweg discusses the proposed taxing of wearing the scarf in Denmark. According to her, such a
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law would alter the meaning of the wearing of the headscarf, as women would be expressing their religious
dedication by paying the fee, while the fee itself would signal the state’s disapproval of the scarf (Korteweg 2013,
p.760).
5 In 2003 French President Jacques Chirac set up a committee – the Stasi commission named after the head of the
committee Bernard Stasi – to examine how the laïcité principle should be applied in practice.
See also the cases of Dahlab v. Switzerland (15 February 2001). Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-V. See
also cases similar to that of Şahin: Karaduman v. Turkey (3 May 1993), Ghazal v. France (3 June 2009),
Gamaleddyn v. France (3 June 2009), Bayrak v. France (3 June 2009), Aktas v. France (3 June 2009), Kurtulmuş v.
Turkey (24 January 2006), Kervanci v. France (4 December 2008), and Köse and 93 others v. Turkey (24 January
2006).
7 Lori  G.  Beaman  expresses  her  puzzlement  about  the  fact  that  women’s  agency  is  assessed  depending  on
motivation; religious women are deemed deficient in their capacity to make the decision to be religious, and agency
is only granted to those who choose not to be religious or to be religious in ways that fit with secular ideals (Beaman
2013, pp.730-1). I would argue that the question of women’s agency in this respect is, unfortunately, if not
irrelevant, then secondary: Muslim women in the Western context are not construed primarily as agents, but as the
Other.
8 Prior to the Grand Chamber ruling in S.A.S. Hunter-Henin (2012, 636) pointed out, in the light of the Ahmet Arslan
case, the case of S.A.S. might, from the Court’s perspective, differed from the previous headscarf cases in the
crucial point that the previous cases were contextualised with the educational setting.
9 Two  judges  of  the  Court  gave  a  partly  dissenting  opinion  to  the  case,  in  which  they  critisised  the  Court  for
sacrificing individual rights to abstract principles.
10 Robert Leckey argues that if we accept that face covering may mean more than one thing, i.e. not be authentically
religious practice, we undercut the freedom of religion claim (Leckey 2013, p.751). There are, however, other rights
and freedoms, such as the freedom of expression that we have recourse to. See also Njål Høstmælingen (2012,
pp.102-3), who has played with the idea that secular female students might wear headscarves as a symbol of
political protest.
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